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I. Introduction
In a seminal article on the political economy of trade protection, Hillman (1982)
proposed a theory of endogeneous protection in which the level of protection provided to
an import-competing industry is determined as an outcome of political competition by
agents in the economy. Hillman adapts the regulation model of Stigler-Peltzman to this
international setting in which the government is viewed as a less benign, political
support-maximizing agent.
More specifically, he uses a Ricardo-Viner type specific factors model of
international trade where owners of the factor specific to the import-competing sector
lobby for protection whereas owners of other factors oppose it. Adopting the Stigler-
Peltzman assumption employed in the context of regulation, he first specifies a political
support function which depends on the welfare levels of two competing groups which, in
turn, depend on the level of the regulated domestic industry price. The implication of
this set-up is that the industry's domestic price is invariant to import price changes
because the political support-seeking policy-maker will always ensure that the domestic
price is maintained at the level where the political support function is maximized.
Therefore, the import tariff will be adjusted to exactly offset any exogenous changes in
the world price.
To escape the conclusion of a static domestic price and to derive more interesting
price dynamics in the face of intensifying import competition, Hillman amends the
Stigler-Peltzman political-support function (SPPSF) by assuming that political support
rather depends on the divergence of welfare levels from their anarchistic free-trade
counterparts rather than on the welfare levels per se. In other words, political support is
responsive only to "gains and losses due to the authorities' acting to cause the domestic
price to deviate from the world price via tariff intervention"; economic agents blame or
credit the government on their welfare changes only j/they are caused by government
intervention. By resorting to this alternative assumption, he derives price dynamics in
'Based on Bernheim-Whinston's menu auction framework, Grossman and Helpman
(1994) provide microfoundations for the reduced-form political-support function.
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which declines in the world price lead to corresponding declines in the domestic price.
Therefore, if the world price continues to decline, protection will not be sufficient to
sustain a domestic price above the break-even point for the domestic producers and
import competition eventually induces them to exit. This result enables him to conclude
that "[pjolitical-support motivated protection to a declining industry is accordingly
transient, and terminal (p.l 184)." Hillman's paper, thereby, gives an impression that a
direct implication of the static domestic price derived from the original SPPSF is
permanent protection that shields the industry indefinitely from outside competitive
pressure.
In this paper, I argue that, in contrast to Hillman's (1982) seminal article, the
government may provide only temporary protection to the declining industry even with
the Stigler-Peltzman type political-support function if the world price continues to
decline. Hillman's logic in the political-support maximization problem, is flawed in that
he inadvertently leaves out the possibility of corner solutions where the industry is left to
shut-down. From the outset, thereby, the government's incentive to remove protection is
simply ruled out by restricting his attention on the interior solution. If the possibility of
pure consumer protection is considered, temporary protection can be restored as a
political equilibrium. As a result, I establish that Hillman's main conclusion of
temporary protection is robust to alternative specifications of the political support
function. This point is important because it is not clear a priori which specification is
more plausible. In fact, a subsequent study by Long and Vousden (1991) takes issue
precisely with Hillman's specification of the political support function. According to
them, "it may be more reasonable to suppose that people care about changes in welfare
(whatever their cause) relative to the situation before the fall [in the world price]."
Even though both specifications predict temporary protection, the price dynamics
generated are qualitatively different across specifications. SPPSF predicts a static price
followed by a sudden drop in the domestic price accompanying trade liberalization
2It is even possible that the policy-maker's response to a decrease in the world price
accelerates the decline of the domestic price.
3This case is called pure "consumer protection" by Peltzman (1976).
whereas the Hillman specification predicts a continuous price decline even during the
period of protection.
In section III, I modify the basic model with SPPSF by allowing partial mobility
of specific capital used in the import competing sector. With convex costs of adjustment,
it is shown that the price dynamics now resemble those of Hillman (1982). However, the
mechanisms responsible for the decline of domestic price before liberalization are
fundamentally different across models.
II. The Hillman Model with the Possibility of Shut-Down.
A. The Original Hillman (1982) Argument
Suppose that the government maximizes the following SPPSF:
M(P)=M(n(P),P), (1)
where P is the domestic price in the import competing industry and n(P) is the
corresponding industry profits. Higher industry profits elicit greater political support
from the owners of the factor specific to the industry. Consumers, however, are
antagonized by higher prices; M n >0 and MP <0. Further assume that n P >0, nP P <0,
Mnn <0 and MPP <0 in the relevant range.5
Let P* and T denote the world price and the specific tariff, respectively. Then, I
have
P= P* + T (2)
Let me define
P° = argmax M(TI(P), P) (3)
4See Hillman (1982) for details.
5To facilitate comparison, I follow closely the notation used by Hillman (1982).
Then, the government sets the domestic price to be equal to P° by using trade policy
instruments, i.e.,
P° = P* + T (4)
This implies that the tariff is adjusted to exactly offset any changes in the world price to
ensure that the static political support maximizing price P° always prevails in the
domestic market, i.e.,
dT= -dP* (5)
Equation (5) is the basis for Hillman's conclusion that SPPSF renders permanent
protection to the declining industry.
B. Political Support Maximization with Corner Solutions
I submit that the original Hillman argument hinges crucially on the exogenously
imposed constraint that n(P) >0. More precisely, let Ps be the break-even price for the
industry. Then, Hillman limits his attention to domestic prices higher than Ps in the
policy-maker's political support maximization problem. In other words, his permanent
protection result with SPPSF is, in a sense, preordained from the outset by excluding the
possibility of shutting down the industry.
To see this, consider Figure 1 (a), which depicts the indifference curves for the
government with the industry profit function. Suppose that the world price declines
continuously. Then, the government will support the domestic price at the level of P°
until the world price P* reaches P , at which point the government is indifferent between
protection and trade liberalization, i.e.,
M(n(P°),P°) = M(0,P) (6)
However, if the world price falls further than that, the government prefers trade
liberalization and opts for pure consumer protection by removing the tariff protection. As
a result, the domestic price experiences a discontinuous drop to the level of the world
price and continues to decline as the world price falls further from that point along the










Figure l(a). Figure l(b).
The Case of Corner Solutions The Case of an Interior Solution
Figure 1: Political Support Maximization with the Stigler-Peltzman Specification
As is clear from Figure 1 (a), P < Ps. Therefore, whether protection is permanent
or temporary depends on the existence of such a P on the positive axis, that is, whether
the iso-majority curve (indifference curve for the policy-maker) tangent to the profit
function crosses the P axis in the positive quadrant. Indeed, the difference between
Figure l(a) in this paper and Figure 2 in Hillman's paper (p.l 183) (reproduced as Figure
l(b) here) is in the location of the iso-majority curves. In Figure l(a), the iso-majority
curve that is tangent to the profit function intersects the P axis while it does not touch the
P axis in Hillman's paper. Which one prevails in the economy depends on various
parameters of the economy. One variable that determines the shapes and locations of
iso-majority curves, inter alia, would be the competitiveness of domestic producers vis-
a-vis foreign producers. If the break-even point Ps is closer to 0 (i.e., domestic producers
are relatively efficient), it is more likely that the case of Figure 1 (b) prevails in the
economy. Figure l(a), however, is more likely with relatively less competitive domestic
producers. In this case, the government will let them exit eventually because sustaining
them forever involves too high a political cost. Note that the dependence of permanency
of protection (or lack of it) on the relative competitiveness of domestic producers is not
6The term "iso-majority" curve is borrowed from Peltzman (1976).
confined only to the SPPSF specification. The same applies to Hillman's anarchistic-
reference-point political support function in that the transience of protection is true only
when domestic producers are sufficiently inefficient compared to foreign producers.
Therefore, both specifications generate a qualitatively similar result on the transience of
protection.
Once we allow for the possibility of pure consumer protection, therefore,
temporary protection can arise as a political equilibrium under alternative political
support function specifications. The price dynamics, however, exhibit qualitatively
different patterns across specifications. With the Hillman-type specification the domestic
price declines continuously in the face of a declining import price even before the
removal of protection. SPPSF specification, in contrast, predicts a static price that is
followed by a precipitous drop to the level of the world price with trade liberalization
(See Figure 2).
One question that can be asked is why the policy-maker would not choose a price
lower than P initially if it can generate a higher level of political support than P° that
protects the sector. Why does he wait until the world price reaches P ? The reason is that
the iso-majority curves for the policy-maker are drawn assuming that there are no subsidy
payments from the government that drain the treasury. In a realistic case where the
government faces a budget constraint, the choice of prices lower than the prevailing
world price will certainly entail financing by distortionary taxes and will definitely reduce
political support.7 Therefore, the choice of prices lower than P without any subsidy on
imports would be possible only when the world price itself &Qc\mQS to this level.
7The analysis can be extended by explicitly introducing the political cost of financing






The Case of the Hillman Specification
P*(t) = the world price (thin curves), P(t) = the domestic price (thick curves)
Figure 2: Price Dynamics with Political Support Maximization
C. Rationale for Quota Protection
The optimal price dynamics generated by SPPSF may also explain the choice of a
quota over a tariff as a favorite instrument to achieve the same level of protection, Note
that the equilibrium values of the domestic price and quantity consumed and the level of
imports with a tariff can be replicated by an equivalent quota. In the face of a declining
import price, however, a quota may have a political advantage over a tariff in that the
level of the quota, once it is implemented, does not need to change until the world price
level reaches the critical value P* whereas a tariff requires constant readjustment for the
tariff protection to sustain the same static political-support-maximizing price P°. This is
because the tariff has to counterbalance any changes in the world price to keep the level
of imports constant and sustain the static political support maximizing price.
Consider the transparency explanation for the choice of instrument proposed by
Magee (1988). According to him, the choice of instrument is governed by the "principle
of optimal obfiiscation" which induces policy-makers to opt for a less transparent means
of income transfers to mitigate political backlash from the adversely affected groups. It is
often argued that quota is politically less costly due to the fact that the protective effect of
a quantitative restriction is less transparent to the losers from protectionist policies than a
tariff which provides an explicit expression of the increase in the domestic price over the
world price. The asymmetry in the transparency of protection would be more
conspicuous when the world price continues to fall. The constant readjustment in the
tariff to offset any fall in the world price may expose the government to the criticism of
"capture" by the protected industry and may prove to be politically more costly than the
equivalent quota.
III. Price Dynamics with Adjustment Cost
Protection against import competition in a declining industry is often justified by
the need to compensate the owners of the specific factor to the industry for their loss of
income. Up to now, we analyzed the time path of protection provided to a declining
industry on the assumption that specific capital used in the importing sector is immobile.
In this section, I allow partial mobility of specific capital to explore the implications of
this adjustment possibility for the price dynamics and industry rationalization.
To analyze the dynamic exit process of capital from the declining import sector,
assume that n(P) represents rents earned by one unit of capital in the importing sector
when the domestic price of the imported good is given by P. The ownership of industry-
specific capital is dispersed. When the capital is moved to other sectors, it earns a
competitive rate of R*.8 As in Mussa (1978), assume that the specific capital used in the
importing sector can be converted to capital usable in other sectors with convex costs of
adjustment. More specifically, let A be the rate of capital movement. Then, the cost of
adjustment function for each unit of capital, C(A) satisfies the following properties:
C(0) = C (0) = 0, and C (A) >0 for any A >0 (7)
With the possibility of changing sizes of industry due to partially mobile capital, it
is natural to assume that the political influence of the industry also changes according to
its size. As in Cassing and Hillman (1986), assume that the supply of protection provided
to the import-competing industry depends on the absolute size of the industry. To
incorporate this fact, I write the political support function in the following way:
M(P;K)=M(KH(P),P) (1)',
8To keep in line with the model in the previous section, the analysis takes a partial
equilibrium approach.
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where K is the amount of specific capital employed in the import-competing sector. In
other words, the political weight given to an industry increases with the size of the
industry.
As in the previous section, define P°(K) as:
P°(K) = argmax M(P; K)=M(KH(P), P) subject to II(P) > 0(3)'
It can be easily verified that the optimal domestic price with protection, P°(K), increases
with K, i.e., d P°(K)/dK >0; due to greater political clout, a bigger industry can solicit a
higher level of protection.9
Also define the critical value of the world price, P, at which the policy-maker is
indifferent between protection and liberalization as:
M(Kn(P°(K)), P°(K)) = M(0, P) (6)'
Then, P (K) can be shown to decrease with K, i.e., d P (K)/dK < 0; as the size of an
industry and its corresponding political influence increases, it requires a lower world
price for the beneficial consumption benefit to outweigh the political cost of trade
liberalization.
Note that P (K) is lower than the break-even point for the domestic producers, Ps.
This implies that any remaining capital in the sector at the time of liberalization will
eventually move to other sectors. With convex adjustment costs, however, there is an
economic incentive to spread adjustment over time in order to avoid congestion rather
than do it all at once. As a result, sectoral adjustment, in general, will begin before the
actual trade liberalization even if "the domestic price shielded by tariff protection provides
9By definition, P°(K) satisfies the following first-order condition: Mn(K nP) + MP= 0.
Total differentiation of this first-order condition gives us:
dP° _ MUUP
dK M^iKUp)1 +MnKnpp+Mpp
Since the denominator is negative by the second-order condition for the maximization of
the political support function and Mn >0, nP>0, we have dP°(K)/dK > 0.
10Totally differentiating (6)' and applying the envelope theorem gives us:
_ dP MnUp
Therefore, — = —-—— <0.
dK Mp
a higher return in the protected sector than R*. The incentive for an early adjustment,
however, reduces the size of the industry, which in turn, has a depressing effect on the
optimal domestic price for the policy-maker and hastens the timing of trade liberalization.
More precisely, let A(t) and P*(t) be the rate of capital outflow from the importing
sector and the world import price at time t, respectively. Suppose that trade is liberalized
at time T. For this to happen, the amount of capital remaining in the importing sector at
time T, KT, must satisfy
P * ( T ) = P ( K T ) (8)
Let Ko = K be the initial level of capital in the importing sector. Then, the rate of capital
outflow from time zero to T satisfies
K-KT (9)
Let me first analyze the dynamics of capital movement from the time of
liberalization, T, on. Let x denote the time period required for the capital movement to
be completed. Since the world price that triggers liberalization is always below the
break-even point, the equilibrium arbitrage condition, in conjunction with the boundary
condition A(T+T)=0, requires the following:
— - C(A(s)) = — e~KT+"s), for any T<S<T+T (10)
r r
Eq. (10) completely determines the dynamics of capital movement (A(s)) from time T to
T+x. Differentiation of (10) with respect to s yields:
-C A1 (s) = R* e'r{T+x-s), for any T<S<T+T (11)
Note that A(s) is monotonically decreasing in s for any T<s<T+x. Moreover, A(s)
depends only on p=(T+r-s), the remaining time to be elapsed for the capital movement to
be completed. This allows me to write A(s) =(|)(T+T-S) = <Kp), where p =T+T-S. Then, the
cumulative capital movement from T to T+T can be written as:
02)
For x to be the equilibrium time span of adjustment for the capital remaining at time T
(KT), it is required that
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d>(x) = KT (13)
Since O(x) is an increasing function of x, Eq. (13) uniquely determines the equilibrium
time needed for adjustment, x, as a function of KT. Note that x(KT) is increasing in KT,
signifying the fact that the more capital remaining in the industry at the time of
liberalization, the more time is needed for the adjustment to be completed. In
equilibrium, each unit of capital should earn the same rent as the last unit exiting the
industry earns, which is (R*/r) e~n . This, in turn, implies that the asset value of each
unit of capital remaining in the importing sector at the time of liberalization depends on
-K.J.
If I define V(KT) as the asset value of remaining capital at the time of
liberalization, the dynamics of pre-liberalization capital movement can be described by
the following arbitrage condition:
— - C(A(t)) = (n[P°(Ks)] e-r(s-l) ds + V(KT) e~r{T-l) for any 0<t<T,
r *
where KS=K- JA(f)dfandV'(KT)<0 (14)
As t approaches T, the RHS of Eq.(14) approaches V(KT), which is less than R*/r. To
restore the equality in Eq. (14), A(t) should be positive, meaning that the capital
adjustment process starts even before liberalization. The pre-liberalization capital flight,
in turn, causes a decrease in the regulated domestic price of the industry output and
hastens the timing of liberalization through its effect on the political support function.
Therefore, partial capital mobility with convex adjustment costs in the SPPSF
specification generates price dynamics similar to Hillman (1982). However, the
mechanisms responsible for the price dynamics are totally different across specifications.
In Hillman (1982), the declining world price is directly responsible for the declining
domestic price because in his specification, political support depends on the differential
between the world and the domestic prices, not the absolute level of the domestic price.
Here, the declining domestic price is, in a sense, self-inflicted on the owners of specific
capital. In anticipation of the eventual liberalization, they start to exit the industry even
before the liberalization in order to avoid congestion in the adjustment process. This
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early exit from the industry reduces the political clout of the industry and causes a decline
in the domestic price.
IV. Conclusion
This short note reconsidered Hillman's (1982) politically-motivated protection of
declining industry in the face of import competition. Hillman suggests that permanency
of protection depends on the specification of the political support function. Hillman's
finding can be disturbing because the model generates conflicting results under
alternative, but equally plausible assumptions. This note points out that the
nonrobustness in Hillman's paper is due to the fact that he inadvertently omitted the
possibility of pure consumer protection in the SPPSF specification. Once this case is
explicitly accounted for, I demonstrate that temporary protection arises as a political
equilibrium across specifications. This exercise is important because the plausibility of
alternative specifications cannot be ascertained a priori. This paper, therefore, shows that
Hillman's basic result of temporary protection is more general than suggested in his paper
because its validity is not confined to his own specification of the political support
function.
I also analyze the price dynamics and the speed of adjustment with the original
SPPSF. Despite the robustness of the temporary protection result, pre-liberalization price
dynamics exhibit different patterns across specifications. Introducing the partial mobility
of specific inputs with convex adjustment costs into the SPPSF, however, restores the
price dynamics of the Hillman specification even though the underlying mechanisms
responsible for the declining domestic prices are rather different.
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